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1. INTRODUCTION 
External financial flows to Africa have quadrupled since 2000 and reached $208.3 billion in 2015, 
making it the largest financial flow to Africa (UNCTAD, 2015). Their composition has also changed 
progressively with remittances and foreign investments from non-OECD countries underpinning this 
positive trend. Although resource rich countries remain the prime destination for FDI to Africa, 
manufacturing and services continue to attract an increasing share of the over 750 new Greenfield FDI 
projects. In contrast, ODA’s share of total external flows keeps diminishing, from 37% in 2002-2006 to 
28% in 2012-2016. Despite this downward trend, ODA still represents the largest external financial flow 
to low-income African countries, reflecting the ODA policy of many African donors.  
Early development theory proposes that foreign aid complements the recipient economy’s domestic 
resources, eases foreign exchange constraints, transfers modern knowledge and managerial skills, and 
facilitates easy access to foreign markets whose combined effects are expected to be favourable for 
economic growth and development (Chenery and Strout, 1966; Griffin, 1970; Ruttan, 1996). However, the 
unsatisfactory growth record of a number of countries despite foreign aid has given rise to aid pessimism 
and the radical anti-aid view (Griffin and Enos, 1970; Weisskopf, 1972). 
Foreign direct investment also plays a significant role in the growth dynamics of recipient economies. 
The literature proposes that FDI can fill three development gaps in recipient economies. It can fill an 
investment/savings gap by providing a much-needed capital to supplement domestic saving and investment; 
a foreign exchange gap by the provision of foreign currency through their initial investment and subsequent 
export earnings; and a tax revenue gap by generating tax revenues through the creation of additional taxable 
economic activities (Quazi 2007, Anyanwu 2011). FDI can also help generate domestically financed capital 
formation (DFCF) by facilitating transfer of managerial skills and technological know-how, increasing 
competition in the domestic market, creating modern job opportunities, expanding global market access for 
locally produced export commodities, and through other positive spillover effects. On the negative side, 
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FDI and multinational enterprises (MNEs) could crowd-out domestic investment (Agosin and Mayer, 2000; 
Qu, et al 2013).  
In analysing the relationship between ODA and FDI, there are two competing views within the ODA-
FDI literature. One view holds that ODA should fund human capital building projects (e.g. schools, 
hospitals) and infrastructure projects (e.g. roads, electricity, telecommunications), which raise the marginal 
productivity of capital (MPC), and can attract more FDI (Quazi, et al 2014). The opposing view holds that 
since investment opportunities in LDCs are usually low and many investment projects are financed by 
ODA, the latter actually crowds-out other types of investment, including FDI. Only a few studies have 
analysed whether ODA facilitates or crowds-out FDI in LDCs and the empirical evidence remains 
inconclusive. The empirical evidence is also thin and inconclusive on whether ODA and FDI independently 
or interactively crowd-in or crowd-out DFCF. 
This paper seeks to contribute to this strand of literature by assessing the extent to which ODA 
influenced FDI and whether these two flows affected DFCF in Africa. More specifically, addressing the 
following questions constitutes the purpose of the paper. (1) To what extent is the observed rise in FDI 
flows to Africa attributable to the magnitude and type of ODA received? (2) What are the interactive and 
independent contributions of ODA and FDI to DFCF in the receiving countries? Tentative answers to these 
queries will be sought in an empirical investigation of panel data from 41 SSA countries, spanning the 
period 1995-2013, which saw considerable changes in the trajectories of FDI and ODA flows. The 
relationships to be explored are modeled in a dynamic setting and estimated using alternative dynamic panel 
data procedures.  
 The rest of this paper is presented as follows. Section two reviews the conceptual and theoretical 
foundations as well as the empirical evidence on the link between ODA and FDI and their implications for 
domestic investment.  The empirical model and methods used for the analysis are described in the third 
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section. The results of the analyses are presented and discussed in section four, while a summary and 
conclusions are offered in section five. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Theoretical Arguments: The link among FDI, ODA and Domestic Capital Formation 
A significant number of theoretical and empirical studies have been undertaken over the last five 
decades to establish a relationship between external resources and domestic savings and investment. This 
debate started with the famous two-gap model of Chenery & Strout (1966) who extended the Harrod-Domar 
model using the works of Lewis and Rostow. They argued that domestic savings and foreign exchange 
earnings were the two most important constraints of economic growth in LDCs. External resources may 
relax these constraints and assist LDCs to achieve a desired rate of growth. Both ODA and FDI are expected 
to influence DFCF. However, the assumption that ODA supplements domestic savings was challenged by 
Rahman (1967), Griffin (1970) and Griffin & Enos (1970) who argued that foreign aid would be a substitute 
for domestic savings as long as the world interest rate was lower than the marginal product of capital.  
However, there are reasons to expect the impact of ODA to be different from that of FDI (e.g. Kosack 
and Tobin, 2006). As ODA is mainly government-centred, its impact on DFCF is directly through increased 
public investment in physical infrastructure and indirectly through social infrastructure, if these belong in 
government spending priorities. The opposite might also be true if the government’s priority is elsewhere. 
The role of ODA in stimulating DFCF would be minimal where it is allocated mostly for non-investment 
type activities such as financing recurrent government expenditures, humanitarian aid, and other 
government consumption expenditures, ending up enlarging the government budget rather than investment 
and growth (Boone, 1995; Kosack and Tobin, 2006). 
On the other hand, FDI is private capital, which is expected to complement domestic savings by adding 
to the total supply of capital to fund new projects and create new fixed assets. Favourable indirect effects 
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are expected through the transfer of technology and managerial skills, the development of human capital, 
and an increase in total factor productivity and overall economic efficiency (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Berthélemy and Démurger, 2000). However, whether FDI will crowd-in or crowd-out DFCF in LDCs is 
theoretically ambiguous, as it depends, among other factors, on the kind of FDI received and the strength 
of domestic firms (Agosin and Mayer, 2000).  
The crowding-in effect of FDI is expected to be higher if it is a green field type that stimulates 
production and thereby capital formation by local firms by creating backward and forward linkages. 
Beneficial spillovers could also be had through imitation of, and access to, new technology, new products 
and processes, better management and expertise, and the opening up of new foreign markets and through 
heightened competition in the product and input markets (Markusen and Venables, 1999; Agosin and 
Mayer, 2000; Görg and Geenaway, 2004). The induced competition between MNEs and local firms is 
expected to improve total factor productivity in the long run as would technology and other knowledge 
transfers from MNEs to the local economy (Chen, 2004; Meyer & Sinani, 2009). As well, by broadening 
foreign and local markets, FDI could attract new local investors and could promote the transformation of 
the informal sector. In addition, FDI may promote domestic investment when it reduces the constraints 
inherent in the host country’s investment climate, e.g. when FDI helps to improve physical infrastructure 
(Arvis, et al, 2007; Dunning, 1998).  
A case can also be made that FDI could crowd out DFCF in LDCs. Multinational enterprises can destroy 
local businesses with their superior technological, managerial and financial know-hows, allowing them to 
create monopolies (Markusen & Venables, 1999; Brainard 1997; Helpman, Melitz & Yeaple, 2003). 
Furthermore, FDI can create unfavorable competition against local firms in the factor market, where foreign 
firms’ demand for resources could raise input prices. Where FDI is oriented towards the exploitation of 
natural resources, foreign investment may disadvantage local industries through a "Dutch disease" type 
process (Krugman, 1987). The increase in exports of natural resources implies an increase in the real 
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effective exchange rate, rendering the non-extractive tradable sectors of the economy less competitive 
(Sachs & Warner, 1997).  
Furthermore, in countries with poor institutions, an FDI-induced exploitation of their natural resources 
may engender political and economic distortions and an unequal distribution of the rents accrued. These 
distortions create barriers to the emergence of new local manufacturing enterprises, contributing indirectly 
to the crowding-out of domestic investment (Sachs & Warner, 1997; Rodrik & Velasco, 1999; Farla, de 
Crombrugghe & Verspagen, 2013). The crowding-out effect on local businesses, in turn, is believed to 
inhibit growth, increase unemployment and further marginalize the poor (Qu, et al, 2013).  
While FDI and ODA may independently influence domestic investment through various mechanisms 
such as those outlined above, their effects could also be transmitted interactively, given the expected 
relationship between them. While the causal relationship could be mutual, the possible effect of ODA on 
FDI flows has received greater attention in the relevant literature. The effects of ODA on FDI may be 
channelled through several ways (Nunnenkamp & Spatz, 2016). Foreign aid could attract FDI flows if it 
increases the marginal productivity of private investment by improving physical and social infrastructure 
(Harms and Lutz, 2006; Kimura and Todo, 2010; Selaya and Sunesen, 2012) and if it helps to improve the 
balance of payments (Harms and Lutz, 2006). In addition, ODA is expected to play a catalysing role through 
the “vanguard effect” whereby aid from a given donor country would increase FDI flows from the same 
country (Kimura and Todo, 2010) and by mitigating the expropriation risk of FDI (Asiedu et al., 2009). On 
the other hand, increased ODA could adversely affect FDI in the event that the former encourages rent-
seeking activity (Harms and Lutz, 2006). 
 
2.2. The Empirical Evidence 
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Most of the empirical research on the economic effects of foreign aid and FDI pertains to economic 
growth, with domestic investment assumed as one of the key factors underlying the link. Given the scope 
of the present work, our review will focus on the cross-country evidence on the direct effects of foreign aid 
on FDI and of the two on DFCF.  
2.2.1. The Effects of ODA and FDI on Domestic investment  
The direct cross-country evidence on the linkage between aid and domestic investment is scanty and 
the indirect one is at best mixed. Serieux (2011), in his study of aid in 29 SSA countries, finds that ODA 
reduces the domestic savings rate. In an earlier study, Serieux (2008) reports a positive effect on growth 
via the investment channel. This corroborates similar findings by others that, under liberalized finance, aid 
tends to be positively associated with liquidity growth and investment, but, predictably, depresses domestic 
saving. On the other hand, a panel data analysis of 10 selected ECOWAS countries by Eregha, Sede and 
Ibidapo (2012) indicates that ODA negatively affects growth and investment.  
Agosin and Mayer (2000) and Agosin & Machado (2005) report that FDI on average exerted a 
crowding-in effect in Asian and a crowding-out effect in Latin American countries included in their study 
both over the whole period (1970-96) and the sub-periods they constructed. For the African sub-sample 
inclusive of 12 countries, the results depended on the time horizon considered—a crowding-in effect in the 
two sub-periods and a neutral average long-run effect during the whole period. A study of 64 developing 
countries by Kasuga (2007), based on panel data of 5-year moving averages, shows that saving and FDI 
positively affect fixed investment. The relative impacts of these financial flows are found to be dependent 
on the countries’ income level, financial structure, and government infrastructure.    
The studies that examined the impact of FDI on domestic investment in the context of Africa include 
that of Ndikumana and Verick (2008) and Ndikumana and Blankson (2015) who report that FDI crowded 
in domestic investment in a panel data of 38 and 50 countries, respectively. Ndikumana and Blankson 
(2015) whose study also included ODA found no evidence that it contributed to domestic investment. 
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Adams (2009) distinguishes between initial and lagged adjustments and finds, for a panel of 42 African 
countries, that FDI exerts a contemporaneous negative, and a lagged positive, effect on domestic 
investment. Mutenyo, Asmah and Kalio (2010) present evidence for the crowding-out effect in their panel 
data analysis of three-year averaged observations from a sample of 34 SSA countries. Fahinde, Abodohoui 
& Su (2015) and Eregha (2012) report similar results based on panel data analyses for ECOWAS and 
WAEMU, respectively. 
2.2.2.  The Effect of ODA on FDI 
One of the first studies to look at the relationship between ODA and FDI was that of Papanek (1973), 
and his results seem to indicate that there is no correlation between them. On the other hand, Selaya and 
Sunesen (2012), using disaggregated data from 99 countries find that foreign aid raises the marginal product 
of capital when it finances complementary inputs, such as public infrastructure projects and human capital 
investment. A crowding-out effect is observed when aid enters the economy in the shape of physical capital 
flows, substituting domestic private investments. The overall effect of these two types of foreign aid on 
FDI is found to be positive, albeit small. 
Kimura and Todo (2010), in their analysis that distinguishes between aid for infrastructure and aid for 
other purposes, find no significant effect of aid on FDI, however, in the case of aid from Japan they find a 
vanguard effect. Similarly, a panel data study of 92 developing countries by Harms and Lutz (2006) shows 
that the marginal effect of ODA on private foreign investment is almost zero. However, this effect is found 
to be positive in countries with weak regulatory institutions. In contrast, Karakaplan, Neyapti & Sayek 
(2005), analysing panel data on 97 countries, report that countries that receive aid also become more likely 
to receive FDI, but this only happens especially in the case of good governance and financial market 
development. On the other hand, Jansky (2012) uncovers no evidence of causal relationship between the 
two variables in a panel data study of 180 countries. 
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In sum, the direct cross-country evidence on the effect of ODA on domestic investment is rather thin; 
and the relationships between the two financial variables and their independent and interactive effects on 
DFCF remain underexplored within the same empirical framework and dataset, especially in the context of 
Africa. The findings of the empirical studies are quite wide ranging, from positive, negative to no 
relationship. Differences in the results may have partly stemmed from variations in sample composition, 
model specifications, estimation methods, and variable representations. The sample composition, both in 
terms of study countries and period is not trivial, since the relationships among the variables of interest 
appear to be sensitive to institutional and structural attributes, which may differ among study countries and, 
to a certain extent, across time.  
There are also differences in specifications with implications for estimation methods and the validity of 
reported results. Most of the related studies analyse investment within a static framework, failing to 
accounting for dynamic effects. Exceptions in this regard include Agosin & Mayer (2000) and Ndikumana 
& Blankson (2015). A number of studies used fixed effects or similar procedures that do not take into 
account the possibility of mutual causation, as the case may be, between FDI and ODA, between DFCF 
and FDI, as well as between the dependent variable of interest and control variables considered. Estimation 
methods that deal with simultaneity bias such as instrumental variables were used by fewer studies (e.g. 
Selaya & Sunesen, 2012; Mutenyo, Asmah & Kalio, 2010; Ndikumana & Blankson, 2015). While most of 
the studies are panel analysis based on annual data, a few of them used three/five-year averaged data to 
mitigate business-cycle effects and minimize measurement errors (e.g. Kasuga, 2007; Mutenyo, Asmah and 
Kalio, 2010; Kimura and Todo, 2010). The majority of the studies do not distinguish between 
contemporaneous and delayed effects. Exceptions in this connection include Adams (2009), Agosin & 
Mayer (2000) and Agosin & Machado (2005). We also note differences in how domestic investment is 
represented and what types of foreign aid and foreign investment are considered in the empirical analysis.   
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND METHOD 
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The role of ODA and FDI in domestic capital formation is assessed by estimating various versions of a 
two-equation model, which recognizes the possibility of, and allows for, mutual causation between FDI 
and DFCF, with ODA appearing as an explanatory variable in both equations. However, ODA is treated as 
an endogenous variable, in view of the potential for it to be influenced by domestic capital formation, as 
more aid may flow to economies where local investment and FDI are low - a case in point is infrastructural 
development aid. However, ODA is not modelled, since our focus is not on its determination. In view of 
the multiplicity of channels through which the said dependent variables are expected to influence each 
other, the empirical model specified here is not derived from a single theoretical framework. In addition to 
the key regressors of interest, the equation for each variable incorporates control variables the selection of 
which is guided by theoretical and empirical considerations.  
3.1. Estimating Equations 
Both FDI and ODA are expected to supplement domestic savings and thereby influence DFCF assuming 
that the latter is liquidity or finance-constrained. However, as previously noted, the effects of these variables 
on DFCF cannot a priori be presumed to be the same. They differ in the channels through which they are 
expected to affect DFCF. Moreover, each is determined through different mechanisms (FDI through private 
channels in contrast to ODA, which involves public institutions), with varying underlying motivations. 
Although the two variables could be simultaneously determined, they nevertheless could affect DFCF 
differently and interactively and are, therefore, entered as two distinct variables in the DFCF equation, 
allowing the data to determine their relative contributions. The effects of the two variables on DFCF are 
examined, controlling for a number of co-determinants including GDP growth, domestic saving rate, trade 
openness, financial development and intermediation, macroeconomic instability, external debt burden, and 
quality of institutions, most of which appear in investment equations in the related literature with varying 
compositions and representations (e.g. Agosin and Mayer, 2000; Agosin and Machado, 2005; Ndikumana 
and Blankson, 2015).  
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The primary explanatory variables of interest in the FDI equation are ODA and DFCF. As mentioned, 
ODA is expected to play a catalysing role or could potentially substitute for FDI, suggesting that the sign 
of its coefficient is indeterminate a priori. The empirical investigation of the relationship between DFCF 
and FDI has mostly been premised on the assumption of a unidirectional causation running from the latter 
to the former. The reverse causation is considered by fewer studies, although this terrain of causation can 
be justified on several grounds (e.g. Ndikumana and Verick, 2008; Lautier and Moreaub, 2012; and the 
references therein). McMillan (1998), as cited by Lautier and Moreaub (2012), rationalizes causation in the 
presence of asymmetry of information where domestic firms enjoy better information about local market 
conditions than foreign investors and where the level of investment in the host country would send a signal 
to foreign investors about economic conditions. In a similar vein, Ndikumana and Verick (2008) use the 
signalling effect whereby higher investment activity at home signals to foreign investors that returns to 
capital are high. Also, increased public investment in the form of infrastructural development could attract 
FDI by increasing factor productivity and reducing transaction costs.1        
The effects of ODA and DFCF on FDI are examined conditional on a number of other economic and 
non-economic determinants identified to be relevant in related empirical studies and on which data are 
available (e.g. Dunning, 1998; Harms and Lutz, 2006; Kimura and Todo, 2010; Anyanwu, 2012; Cleeve, 
Debrah and Yiheyis, 2015). The control variables considered include real GDP, population, real GDP per 
capita, real GDP growth, openness, endowment of natural resources, quality of institutions, macroeconomic 
instability, and financial, infrastructural and human capital development.  
The two variables, DFCF and FDI, are also specified to depend on their lagged values to capture 
inertia and partial adjustment. The baseline estimating equations take the following form.2 
                                                 
1 See Lautier and Moreaub (2012) for details on these and a summary of other effects, mostly indirect, of domestic investment 
on FDI.  
2 See appendix (Table A1) for a summary of definitions and representations of variables as well as data sources.  
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dfcfit = α0+α1dfcfit-1 +α2fdiit+α3fdiit-1+α4odait+α5odait-1+ϕ1JZ1it +μ1i +ε1it                   (1) 
fdiit= α0+α1fdiit-1+α2dfcfit +α3dfcfit-1 +α4odait+α5odait-1+ϕ2JZ2it +μ2i +ε2it                   (2) 
where Z is a vector of control variables listed elsewhere. 
 
 
3.2. Estimation Issues and Method  
The parameterizing of the model specified above involves several estimation issues including the 
following. First, actual or observed data are unavailable on DFCF, which is to be distinguished from 
domestic fixed capital formation, an aggregate of DFCF and FDI. Most of the studies with domestic 
investment as the dependent variable use aggregate investment inclusive of the foreign-financed 
component. Although the effect of FDI on DFCF can be indirectly calculated from a regression of aggregate 
investment, for our purpose, which also includes determining the separate effects of ODA both on FDI and 
DFCF, it will be useful to use DFCF, rather than aggregate domestic fixed capital formation, as the 
dependent variable.  Following, among others, Younas (2011), we generate the DFCF series as a residual 
by subtracting FDI, as defined above, from aggregate domestic fixed capital formation. This approach is 
far from perfect partly because not all FDI flows represent actual investment that translates into increased 
domestic physical capital stock, especially when is not a greenfield type, although attempt is made to 
circumvent this problem by using the change in FDI stock as a measure of FDI flows. 
Second, the main variables of interest, such as DFCF, FDI and ODA, tend to be subject to volatility and 
sensitive to domestic and foreign business-cycle effects. Third, in common with other macro data, 
aggregation and measurement errors are expected in the annual series of the variables of interest. To 
overcome these problems and in recognition of the fact that ODA and FDI may take time before their effects 
are felt, we use a three-year averaged series, which possess the additional advantage of dealing with missing 
observations.3 Fourth, as mentioned, some of the variables in the model are likely to be simultaneously 
                                                 
3 We use the three-year average, rather than the more common five-or ten-year average series, to allow a reasonable period 
dimension to avoid significant loss of information and degrees of freedom, given our relatively short sample period, 1995-2013 
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determined. As well, certain control variables are likely to be influenced by the dependent variables they 
are hypothesized to explain, raising the issue of potential endogeneity and simultaneity bias. Cases in point 
are economic growth, real GDP per capita, and to a certain degree, ODA.  
Lastly, the estimating equations include lagged dependent variables as explanatory variables in their 
respective equations, rendering a panel estimation method controlling for country-specific effects, such as 
fixed-effect or random-effects procedure, inappropriate because of the correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the error terms. One of the preferred estimation procedures in this case is the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data estimator. The “difference” version of this 
approach uses appropriate lags—in level form—of the dependent variable (dated t-2 or earlier) and 
available lags of the other regressors as instruments of the differenced lagged dependent variable (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). 
 However, for a data series that exhibit persistence and are close to random walk, lagged levels are 
shown to be poor instruments for their differenced counterparts, in which case using a “system”-GMM 
approach is recommended (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This would be our 
preferred method in view of the stylized fact about the time-series property of macroeconomic indicators, 
which constitute the majority of the model variables. This estimator combines the regression in differences 
(relevant variables instrumented by appropriate lags of the dependent and endogenous variables) and 
regression in levels (relevant variables instrumented by lagged differences). This estimator also 
conveniently handles the previously mentioned simultaneity bias that would arise because of the other 
endogenous explanatory variables (fdi, dfcf gdppc, Δinf) or predetermined regressors (gdpgr-1), using 
appropriate lags as instruments. 
                                                 
(for a similar approach, see e.g. Kimura and Todo, 2010; Mutenyo, Asmah and  Kalio, 2010.), Cleeve and Yiheyis, 2014). 
Accordingly, the unbalanced panel data from 41 study countries comprise a maximum of six periods, depending on data 
availability. The 6th period covers four years, 2010-2013.  
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Various versions of the two equations were estimated using alternative procedures for purposes of 
comparison and checking robustness. 
4.1. Estimates of the domestic investment model 
  Table 1 records the parameter estimates of the domestic investment model. Application of OLS to the 
pooled data, assuming that the study countries are otherwise homogenous, generates the results in Column 
I. Foreign aid and fdi have disparate effects, signed positive and negative, respectively, although the former 
is significant only at the 10% level. The signs are reversed at one-period lag. Accounting for heterogeneity 
across countries using the fixed-effects procedure expands the vector of significant coefficient estimates. 
However, as mentioned, the use of this method in a dynamic setting introduces an endogeneity problem 
owing to the correlation between the dependent variable and the country-specific fixed effects.  
The results from the “difference” GMM method, which addresses this problem, appear in Column III.4 
This procedure assumes that there is no second-order serial correlation, AR(2), in first-differenced errors 
and that the instruments are valid. The null hypotheses of no serial correlation and of over-identifying 
restrictions (whether the instruments as a group appear exogenous and are valid) are tested using the 
Arellano-Bond tests of second-order serial correlation and the Sargan/Hansen tests of over-identifying 
restrictions, respectively.5 The diagnostic tests confirm that the first-differenced series are not serially 
correlated of second order and that the instruments are valid.  Focussing on the key variables of interest, 
the coefficients on oda and the lagged term of fdi emerged statistically zero.  
                                                 
4  See Table A2, note 1.  
5 The Hansen J statistic is robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, while the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 
is not. Since all our estimations are based on robust standard errors, the former is the relevant test. However, this statistic is 
weakened by many instruments (Roodman, 2009). The two test results are juxtaposed to indicate the validity of the instruments 
under both assumptions. 
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The results generated from employing the preferred system-GMM method are recorded in Columns IV-
IX.6  As in the previous case, the diagnostic test results for all specifications fail to reject the null hypotheses 
of no second-order serial correlation and of valid over-identifying restrictions or valid instruments. Looking 
at the baseline model (Column IV), oda’s contemporaneous effect on dfcf turns out to be significantly 
positive; and the coefficients on fdi retain their signs, albeit at a lower level of significance with respect to 
its lagged term.7 The lagged dependent variable now becomes significantly positive as would be expected. 
Invariably, the control variables open and govt were found highly insignificant regardless of the estimator 
employed; and the popgr coefficient is rendered statistically zero when the preferred method is applied.  
Dropping these three controls in the interest of parsimony and re-estimating the model produce no 
qualitative changes on the coefficients of interest, except that the lagged term of fdi is no longer significant 
(Column V).8 However, the null hypotheses that the contemporaneous and lagged terms of the two variables 
of interest are each jointly equal to zero are soundly rejected, and the sums of the two effects for each 
variable are found statistically significant.9The results suggest that in the long-run, ceteris paribus, a one 
percentage-point increase in oda leads to nearly a proportionate increase in domestically financed capital 
formation. On the other hand, an equivalent rise in FDI flows would crowd out domestic investment by 
0.82 percentage point.10 
Thus far, the independent effects of oda and fdi were examined on holding the other variable constant. 
A regression excluding one of the two variables while keeping the other weakens the statistical significance 
of oda’s contemporaneous effect (Column VI) and strengthens that of fdi’s lagged effect (Column VII), 
                                                 
6 For example, for Column IV the internal instruments used are listed in Table A2, note 2.   
7 We used two lags for the variables of interest in initial estimations. The second lags were found highly insignificant and were, 
therefore, dropped. In addition, in initial estimations period dummy variables were included but were found jointly insignificant. 
8 A Wald F test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the three variables are jointly equal to zero. 
9 Using specification in column V, null hypothesis: Jointly equal to zero—odat and odat-1 (F-stat=4.16, prob.=0.023), fdit and 
fdit-1 (F=7.4, prob.=0.002), and all four (F=4.33, prob.=0.005). Null hypothesis: Linear combinations (sum of coefficients) equal 
to zero—odat and odat-1 [coefficient=0.4198 (2.88)***], fdit and fdit-1 [coefficient=-0.3336 (3.01)***].  
10 Given the estimates in column V, the long-run effects on dfcf are similarly signed. A non-linear combination test of the sum 
of the two terms of each variable divided by 1 minus the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable yield the 
following results: oda [coefficient=1.03 (2.69)** and fdi [coefficient=-0.8184 (6.30)***]. 
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with an increase in their numerical significance, especially in the latter’s case. This is probably suggestive 
of the appropriateness of controlling for one in determining the effect of the other. 
The estimations so far are based on data of the two variables of interest as a continuous series, which 
tend to involve cyclicality and measurement errors, although period averaging was used to mitigate the 
potential bias thereof. To check the robustness of the results, the two variables were admitted as 
dichotomous rather than as a continuous series by dividing the pooled data into two groups using their 
respective median values as cut-off points. The binary variables are constructed as follows: 
   highnoda=1 if noda>=median of noda, zero otherwise 
   highfdi=1 if fdi>=median of fdi, zero otherwise. 
Replacing oda and fdi with highnoda and highfdi, respectively, and treating both as endogenous 
variables, we find the estimates appearing in Column VIII. Both emerge significant at the 5% level, noda 
with a favourable and fdi with a negative effect. The estimates suggest that the domestic investment rate is 
seven percentage points higher when noda is above the median than when it is not. On the other hand, high 
fdi is associated with a 10 percentage-point decrease in the domestic investment rate compared to the base 
category of low fdi. As noted, the contemporaneous effect of fdi on domestic investment by residents is 
significantly negative, while its delayed effect is positive, albeit not always significant. We also use the 
pre-existing stock of FDI in lieu of lagged FDI inflows - as a measure of accumulated (embodiment of) the 
benefits and detriments of FDI previously outlined. The estimates in Column IX clearly show that the pre-
existing stock of FDI favourably influences domestic investment more strongly than lagged FDI flows, 
with contemporaneous FDI remaining significantly negative.  
With respect to the control variables, the parameter estimate of the lagged dependent variable is sizeable 
and highly significant, indicating the path dependence of investment activity in the study countries. Overall, 
the estimates also suggest that an increase in the domestic saving rate, an improvement in the quality of 
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institutions, and a decrease in the debt burden spur domestic investment. Higher macroeconomic instability 
as measured by changes in the inflation rate appears to deter investment activity.  
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TABLE 1. 
Estimates of the investment model—Dependent variable: dfcf 
Expl. 
Variables 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
DIFF 
GMM 
System GMM 
 
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
dfcft-1 0.7215 0.5665 0.4734 0.5811 0.5924 0.7916 0.7456 0.6585 0.5073  
(9.60)*** (6.1)*** (1.53) (5.89)*** (5.18)*** (6.88)*** (4.83)*** (5.21)*** (3.64)*** 
odat 0.1507 0.2611 0.0274 0.3603 0.3393 0.3914 … 7.3776 0.4253  
(1.72)* (3.31)*** (0.13) (2.44)** (2.08)** (1.82)* 
 
(2.15)** (2.08)** 
odat-1 -0.0724 0.1151 0.0039 0.0456 0.0806 0.1845 … … ---  
(1.16) (1.91)* (0.04) (0.40) (0.76) (0.224) 
  
 
fdit -0.7473 -0.7355 -0.6285 -0.6375 -0.5349 … -0.5717 -10.0176 -0.4302  
(11.03)*** (12.25)*** (4.17)*** (3.4)*** (3.65)*** 
 
(3.60)***  (2.43)** (3.29)*** 
fdit-1 0.4631 0.3336 0.1880 0.2484 0.2013 … 0.3472 … ----  
(5.21)*** (2.85)*** (0.95) (1.79)* (1.58) 
 
(2.41)** 
 
 
gdst 0.0772 0.1334 0.2385 0.1518 0.1566 0.2138 0.082 0.1791 0.1328  
(2.86)*** (1.98)** (1.83)* (2.92)*** (2.18)** (2.00)** (2.96)*** (2.02)** (1.52) 
gdpgrt-1 -0.0203 -0.0003 -0.2906 -0.0333 … … --- … ---  
(0.24) (0.00) (1.53) (0.30) 
    
 
Δinf -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 
(1.81)* (5.48)*** (2.03)** (2.12)** (3.46)*** (3.18)*** (2.88)***  (2.16)** (3.14)*** 
opent 0.0019 0.0353 0.0171 0.0267 … … … … ---  
(0.17) (0.82) (0.23) (0.87) 
    
 
crdtt 0.0238 0.1081 -0.0076 0.0539 0.0518 0.0712 -0.0165 0.1054 0.0222  
(1.13) (2.47)** (0.1) (1.56) (1.38) (1.39) (0.640) (1.66)* (0.52) 
insttnt 0.4336 1.6302 2.1435 0.5584 0.6754 0.2593 0.4947 0.5624 0.8363  
(2.11)** (3.05)*** (2.46)** (1.68)* (2.51)** (0.99) (1.56) (1.71)* (2.92)*** 
popgrt 0.7915 0.7140 1.7694 0.2984 … … 
 
… --- 
 
(1.80)* (1.47) (2.37)** (0.52) 
    
 
govtt 0.0762 -0.0811 -0.0194 0.0461 … … 
 
… --- 
 
(1.06) (0.57) (0.10) (0.63) 
    
 
dbtst -0.2190 -0.3083 -0.1797 -0.2752 -0.2378 -0.3522 -0.2325 -0.3375 -0.2354  
(2.43)** (4.06)*** (1.29) (2.48)** (2.27)** (1.19) (1.88)* (1.36) (1.87)* 
logfdistkt-1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.8147 
(3.24)*** 
  
No. Obs. 234 234 191 234 235 235 235 235 235 
F stat 47.3*** 156.2*** 10.5*** 57.7*** 76.8*** 22.5*** 68.5*** 19.4*** 84.6*** 
AB-AR(1) --- … 0.067 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.011 
AB-AR(2) --- … 0.192 0.302 0.985 0.520 0.734 0.351 0.931 
Sargan t --- …. 0.077 0.169 0.638 0.681 0.495 0.409 0.450 
Hansen t --- …. 0.049 0.231 0.45 0.247 0.755 0.564 0.505 
Notes: All regressions except the Difference GMM are estimated with a common intercept, not shown in the table. Figures in parentheses are 
absolute values of t-ratios, which are based on robust standard errors. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, ***, 
respectively. Entries for AB Sargan/Hansen tests are probabilities for their respective null hypotheses of no autocorrelation and no 
overidentification, respectively. In Column VIII, noda and fdi are represented by dichotomous variables highnoda and highfdi, respectively. 
 
19 
 
To check for nonlinearity and examine the robustness of the results, quadratic terms of the key variables 
were separately added in their respective regressions (Columns I and II of Table 2). The estimates of the 
coefficients on the quadratic terms associated with oda and fdi are found to be statistically zero, while their 
linear counterparts remain significant, retaining their previously reported signs. The results provide no 
evidence of nonlinearity in the respective relationships and attest to the robustness of the contemporaneous 
effects.11 
TABLE 2. 
Estimates of the dfcf model with interactive effects and alternative measures of oda: System GMM 
estimates 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
                                    ODA= 
   S&E Production Production Total (oda) 
I II III IV V 
 
VI VII 
ODAt 0.5384 
(2.46)** 
0.4711 
(2.32)** 
0.4347 
(2.15)** 
0.7394 
(0.83) 
1.478 
(0.89) 
2.0890 
(1.79)* 
0.3775 
(2.19)** 
ODAt-1 --- --- --- 0.3415 
(0.74) 
1.949 
(2.69)** 
--- --- 
fdit -0.4279 
(3.46)*** 
-0.4391 
(3.33)*** 
-0.4291 
(3.73)*** 
-0.8172 
(8.94)*** 
-0.7868 
(9.08)*** 
-0.5385 
(4.27)*** 
-0.3332 
(1.54) 
fdit-1 --- --- --- 0.2970 
(2.2)** 
0.2084 
(1.18) 
--- --- 
odat×fdit --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0333 
(2.43)** 
ODAt×fdit --- --- --- --- --- -0.1269 
(1.71)* 
--- 
fdit×natres_h --- --- -0.1433 
(1.86)* 
--- --- --- --- 
Odat 2 -0.0057 
(0.95) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
fdit2 --- -0.0003 
(0.15) 
--- --- --- --- --- 
No. Obs. 235 235 235 196 196 196 196 
F stat 100.8*** 121.4*** 263.3*** 90.8*** 126*** 70.7*** 106.3*** 
AB-AR(1) 0.013 0.006 0.004 0.01 0.002 0.003 0.004 
AB-AR(2) 0.967 0.912 0.757 0.853 0.557 0.819 0.674 
Sargan test 0.582 0.131 0.342 0.441 0.204 0.080 0.036 
Hansen test 0.692 0.228 0.676 0.627 0.441 0.165 0.271 
Notes: Estimates are generated controlling for the other variables included in model V in table 1 using the one-step system 
GMM estimator. In columns I-III and VII, official development assistance is represented by oda, as defined before. In columns 
IV, V and VI, the disaggregated components of aid are considered. The sample size in the last four columns is adjusted to be 
the same to make the estimates comparable. The type of aid considered in each column of results is indicated in the respective 
column captions. S & E: Aid committed to social and economic infrastructure use and services. See also notes to table 1.  
                                                 
11 As a further check on nonlinearity, we tested if the relationships between dfcf, on the one hand, and oda and fdi, on the other, 
were conditional on the relative size of the last two variables by segmenting observations into two categories.  The differential 
slope estimates were found statistically insignificant.  
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One of the notable attributes of FDI to Africa is that it is predominantly of the resource-seeking type. 
This implies limited complementarity with, and diminished crowding-in effect on, local investment. The 
implication of the type of FDI inflows for the relationship between the latter and DFCF is examined by 
interacting fdi with a destination’s resource endowment. We used resource rent (% of GDP) as a proxy for 
resource endowment and classified the sample on the basis of the period average rate of resource rents, with 
25% as a cut-off point, such that natres_h=1 if resource rents (as % of GDP) is above 25%, and zero 
otherwise. The interactive term is estimated with a negative sign, and it is statistically significant at the 10% 
level (Column III). According to the estimation results, FDI exerts a negative contemporaneous effect on 
domestically financed capital formation in the typical study country; however, its crowding-out effect 
appears to be larger in countries where the resource-seeking type of FDI inflows is sizeable, consistent with 
the view previously stated.12  
As mentioned, whether foreign aid favorably impacts domestic investment is expected to depend on the 
composition of aid received. The model in Column V of Table 1 was, therefore re-estimated on 
disaggregated data.13  Following, among others, Selaya and Sunesen (2012), we make a distinction between 
two types of aid, as per OECD’s sectoral disaggregation.  One of the categories considered is aid committed 
to social infrastructure use and services (education, health, water supply projects and the like) and economic 
infrastructure uses and services including energy, transportation and communications. This category of aid 
may be viewed as contributing to the supply of complementary factors. The second type of aid is that 
allocated directly to the production sectors of the economy such as agriculture, manufacturing, and trade. 
Official development assistance associated with complementary inputs, as defined above, appears to have 
                                                 
12  Including natural resource rent (natres) as an additional regressor (as a continuous series, treated as endogenous) and 
interacting it with fdi generates negative coefficients on fdit and the interactive term, and a positive coefficient on natrest, all 
significant at the 1% level. 
13 For this purpose, we used the time series data disaggregated by sector from OECD Development Assistance Community 
(DAC), which includes the major donors to the study countries for most of the period under consideration. We use data on aid 
commitments rather than disbursements because of the relative paucity of time series data on the latter. However, the two series 
are highly correlated, and committed funds could be taken as a reasonable proxy for their disbursed counterparts (Selaya and 
Sunesen, 2012 and the references cited therein). All are expressed as % of GDP. 
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a positive but highly insignificant contemporary and lagged effect on domestic investment (Table 2). In 
contrast, the effect of aid allocated to the productive sector is more sizable, with a significantly positive 
lagged effect. 
 Focusing on contemporaneous relationships, we observe in Columns IV and V of Table 2 that fdi and 
foreign aid exert both independent and interactive effects on domestic investment, albeit at varying levels 
of significance. The results suggest that while official development assistance favorably influences 
domestic investment, its impact seems to diminish with a rise in fdi. Likewise, the contemporaneous 
crowding-out effect of fdi appears to increase with foreign aid. One may surmise from the signs of the 
separate and interactive effects that the financial inflows in question have been substitutes in influencing 
domestic investment activity in the study countries. Clearly, the findings suggest no evidence that the two 
flows have been complementary. 
4.2. Estimates of the fdi model 
The estimates of the fdi model are reported in Table 3. According to the pooled OLS estimates, fdi 
significantly responds to dfcf, but imperceptibly so to noda, the lagged effect of which becomes 
significantly positive only when heterogeneity across countries is assumed. The parameter estimates of dfcf 
remain robust to the application of the difference GMM estimator unlike those of noda, which now become 
insignificant (Column III).14The system-GMM estimates are qualitatively similar to their difference GMM 
counterparts with respect to the variables of interest (Column IV). One of the noticeable differences pertains 
to the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, which emerges significantly positive, when the system-
GMM estimator is applied.15  
 
                                                 
14 For the difference GMM (Column III), the instruments used are Δ(open insttn logpop infst) and L(2/3).(dfcf noda fdi Δinf 
loggdppc gdpgr natres gdpgr) where L(2/3)=lag 2 to 3.  
15
For example, for Column IV the internal instruments used are listed in Table A2, note 3.  
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TABLE 3. 
 
Estimates of the fdi model 
  
Explanatory Variables 
Pooled OLS Panel Fixed Effects DIFF GMM System GMM  
I II III IV V VI 
fdit-1 0.5506 0.2967 0.4052 0.5299 0.5678 0.5643 
  (5.72)*** (2.36)*** (1.58) (3.11)*** (4.67)*** (3.24)*** 
dfcft -0.9639 -0.9267 -0.7635 -0.8766 --- -0.9809 
  (15.4)*** (20.95)*** (3.43)*** (6.29)***  (6.77)*** 
dfcft-1 0.6766 0.4136 0.7093 0.7185 --- 0.8615 
  (8.08)*** (3.72)*** (2.19)** (3.94)***  (4.21)*** 
nodat 0.1297 0.0553 0.0983 0.0225 0.1839  
  (1.3) 0.56 (0.28) (0.12) (0.50) -2.8075 
nodat-1 -0.0347 0.1594 -0.0955 -0.1206 -0.2987 (0.69) 
  (0.45) (2.05)** (0.47) (1.15) (1.71)*  
opent 0.0157 0.0922 0.1047 0.0372 0.1079 0.0477 
  (1.00) (1.62) (1.00) (0.88) (1.85)* (0.89) 
log(gdppct) 0.0964 -9.3005 -8.2465 -5.6721 -5.3969 -8.2713 
  (0.15) (2.55)** (0.39) (2.57)** (1.28) (2.77)*** 
gdpgrt 0.3077 0.3207 0.9746 0.9380 -0.2144 1.0670 
  (1.67)* (2.38)** (1.03) (2.07)** (0.20) (2.3)** 
Δinft -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0011 
  (1.97)** (6.39)*** (1.28) (2.26)** (1.23) (2.26)** 
insttnt 0.3561 1.3446 0.5151 1.3429 0.8928 1.6071 
  (1.28) (3.5)*** (0.42) (2.44)** (1.07) (2.82)*** 
log(popt) 0.0907 18.2687 13.1866 -1.5573 -0.6217 -1.9410 
  (0.27) (3.83)*** (0.87) (1.63) (0.40) (1.59) 
infstt 0.0465 0.0272 0.0596 0.0885 0.0685 0.1079 
  (4.05)*** (1.68)* (0.98) (4.54)*** (1.79)* (3.78)*** 
natrest 0.0357 -0.1198 -0.0475 0.2176 0.1536 0.2004 
  (1.00) (1.41) (0.09) (3.04)*** (0.98) (2.11)** 
        
No. Obs. 241 241 198 241 241 241 
F stat 61.7*** 133.9*** 29.9*** 71.1*** 25.6*** 35.7*** 
AB-AR(1) ... ... 0.094 0.030 0.003 0.046 
AB-AR(2) ... ... 0.951 0.704 0.163 0.779 
Sargan test ... ... 0.727 0.065 0.221 0.546 
Hansen test ... ... 0.000 0.432 0.502 0.450 
Notes: In Column VI, noda is represented by a dichotomous variable, highonda. See also notes to Table 1. 
 
 
The coefficients on the other control variables in the baseline model have the expected signs except 
logpop, which, however, is insignificant. Trade openness appears to help attract FDI, but the parameter 
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estimate is not robust to different estimations. In contrast, the logarithm of per capita real GDP, for the most 
part, emerges significantly negative. This is to be expected, if real GDP per capita is taken as a proxy for 
real wage, or the reciprocal of it as a return on investment. Excluding dfcf from the regression makes the 
lagged term of noda significantly negative at the 10% level. We also segmented observations on noda into 
two categories, its median as a cutoff point. The results indicate that higher level of noda is associated with 
lower fdi; however, its coefficient is highly insignificant (Column VI).     
The balance of the evidence thus far suggests that noda exerted no robust, statistically significant impact 
on fdi. The contemporaneous effect is consistently statistically zero, while the lagged effect, as per the 
preferred estimator, is negative, attaining no greater than a 10% level of significance, even that only when 
dfcf is not controlled for.  As mentioned in the literature review, the type of ODA received could matter for 
the relationship between the latter and FDI. To test this hypothesis, we use data disaggregated based on 
whether it was bilateral or multilateral and whether it was allocated to complementary or productive 
activities, as previously described (Table 4).16 The results suggest that, like total aid, neither bilateral nor 
multilateral aid has discernable contemporaneous effect on fdi. While both types of aid appear to discourage 
fdi with a lag, the relationship is significant only in the case of bilateral aid. This indicates that the lagged 
adverse FDI impact of oda is driven by bilateral aid and that bilateral donors commit more aid where FDI 
inflows are relatively low, contradicting the view that the two flows are complementary.  
 
TABLE 4. 
 Estimates of the fdi model with alternative measures of ODA: System GMM Estimates 
                                                 
16 The multilateral aid series are generated as a residual, subtracting bilateral aid from total ODA.  
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  ODA=    
 Bilateral Multilateral S&E Production  
Explanatory Variables I 
 
II 
 
III 
 
IV 
 
 
ODAt -0.1338 0.0382 -1.1427 1.6357   
(0.57) (0.05) (1.77)* (0.60)  
ODAt-1 -0.3807 -0.5988 0.7132 1.8773   
(2.31)** (1.48) (1.93)* (1.18)  
dfcft -0.7250 -0.6736 -0.9238 -1.0933   
(4.29)*** (4.43)*** (7.6)*** (6.41)***  
dfcft-1 0.6813 0.6229 0.6229 0.6488   
(3.55)*** (3.36)*** (3.93)*** (4.43)***   
  
  
 
No. Obs. 201 201 201 201  
F stat 33.9*** 59.8*** 54.1*** 91.2***  
AB-AR(1) 0.019 0.020 0.002 0.001  
AB-AR(2) 0.646 0.507 0.795 0.467  
Sargan test 0.105 0.323 0.608 0.405  
Hansen test 0.626 0.117 0.566 0.298  
Notes: Estimates are generated controlling for the other variables included in model IV in table xxx using the one-step system 
GMM estimator.  S& E: Aid committed to social and economic infrastructure use and services. See also notes to table 1. 
 
There is a clear difference between aid committed to complementary and productive activities in terms 
of both the nature and significance of the observed FDI effects. Contemporaneously, aid that contributes to 
the supply of complementary inputs negatively affects fdi at the 10% level, while that allocated to the 
productive sector has an imperceptibly positive impact. The delayed effects of both are positive but only 
that associated with complementary inputs is moderately significant. The results suggest that the FDI effect 
of aid marginally depends on the purpose for which it is allocated and how it is used. While allocations to 
the productive sector, which may be viewed as competing with FDI, hardly influenced the latter, there is a 
slight evidence to suggest that aid augmenting complementary inputs may have the potential to attract FDI 
inflows, albeit with a lag.  
 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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This paper assesses the impact of official development assistance on FDI and of both on domestically 
financed capital formation in 41 SSA countries over the period 1995-2013. The relationship between FDI 
and ODA together with their separate and interactive effects on domestic fixed capital formation is 
examined in a two-equation model, both formulated in a dynamic setting reflective of partial adjustments 
and inertia.  
Estimates of the domestic investment equation suggest that FDI crowds out domestic investment 
contemporaneously with a moderately favourable lagged effect. The contemporaneous effect of ODA is in 
general significantly positive. Its delayed effect is found significantly favourable only with respect to the 
part of aid allocated to production. Foreign direct investment is found to respond more significantly to 
domestic investment activity than to ODA. Taken together, the results from the two equations point to a 
mutual causation between FDI and DFCF and suggest that fostering domestic investment activity could 
potentially serve as a catalyst for FDI with a lag, although the long-run effect is not encouraging. On 
balance, an increase in ODA is not found to encourage FDI inflows. In fact, a negative association is 
observed depending on the type of aid and the lag structure considered. The interactive effects of the two 
flows on domestic investment are significantly negative, suggesting that the two flows lack 
complementarity. Neither multilateral aid nor bilateral aid is observed to have contemporaneous effect on 
FDI; and bilateral aid tends to discourage FDI with a lag, implying that they are substitutes for each other.   
In conclusion, the findings of this study provide no evidence that the two sources of external finance 
have been complementary in their impacts on domestic capital formation in the typical study country. The 
observed crowding out effect of FDI suggest that to the extent FDI contributes to economic growth in the 
receiving countries, as some studies suggest, it is apparently not because of its positive impact on locally 
financed investment activity. The contemporaneous crowding out effect, not offset by the lagged crowding 
in effect hardly attests to the role of FDI in fostering and sustaining economic growth through domestic 
investment in the typical destination country in the continent. The crowding-out effects reported in this and 
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other studies may, in part, reflect policies that have been pursued to lure FDI, which may have ended up 
adversely impacting local entrepreneurship and investment activity, suggesting the need to review FDI-
related incentives and investment policies in general with a view to mitigating and circumventing the likes 
of the adverse effects observed. The favorable effect of ODA independent of and separate from FDI indicate 
that there is a potential role for it to offset the adverse effect of FDI if receiving governments were to use it 
judiciously and donors were to target and monitor its use once disbursed.   
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APPENDIX-TABLE A1: VARIABLE REPRESENTATIONS AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable 
Symbol 
Definition and Representation Source 
fdi Foreign direct investment, generated as a change in the stock of 
foreign direct investment (% of GDP) 
UNCTAD FDI database 
(http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Statisti
cs.aspx 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database 
(WDI) 
dfcf Domestic fixed capital formation by residents (% of GDP), 
derived by subtracting fdi from aggregate domestic fixed capital 
formation (% of GDP) 
UNCTAD and WDI for base 
variables 
oda Official development assistance (% of GDP) Aggregate ODA and bilateral 
ODA: World Bank’s WDI. 
Disaggregate ODA data by sector 
from OECD’s International 
Development Statistics (IDS) 
(http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/). 
open The sum of exports and imports (% of GDP): Trade openness: WDI 
crdt Credit to the private sector (% of GDP): Degree of financial 
intermediation/development*  
WDI 
dbts Debt service (% of GNI): External debt burden WDI 
insttn Indicator of quality of governance/ institutions: We use the first 
principal component of six governance indicators, each ranging 
from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values reflecting better governance 
outcomes.**  
WDI 
infst Mobile telephone penetration rate—the number of mobile 
subscriptions per 100 of population: Communication 
infrastructure 
International Telecommunication 
Union database. 
govt Government consumption expenditure (% of GDP): Fiscal policy WDI 
natres Natural resources rent (% of GDP): Natural resources 
endowment: For a similar representation, see e.g. Cleeve, Debra 
and Yiheyis (2015) & Ndikumana and Blankson (2015). 
WDI 
rgdp Real GDP: Market size WDI 
rgdpg Real GDP growth: Market growth WDI 
rgdppc Real GDP per capita in constant US dollars: Purchasing power, 
productivity, return on investment 
WDI 
pop Population: Market size 
popgr=population growth rate 
WDI 
Δinf Macroeconomic instability: Change in CPI inflation where 
available; GDP deflator otherwise: Macroeconomic instability 
WDI 
Zit Vector of other control variables identified above  See above 
μit; εit Unobserved country-specific effect; the error term  Not applicable 
it i denotes the study country and t the period. Not applicable 
Notes:  
*This may also represent domestic credit availability, which would be pertinent to consider in the presence of credit constraint 
where the availability/quantity of credit is more relevant than its cost as a determinant of investment.  
**These indicators represent six dimensions of system of governance that rate a country’s administrative and political 
performance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009, p.5). The indicators are: voice and accountability, political instability and 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and control of corruption. The first principal component is 
used to reduce the excessive number of regressors (relative to the sample size) that the inclusion of the indicators would otherwise 
entail. 
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APPENDIX-TABLE A2: Further Explanation and Notes on the Estimation Results 
Note No. Extended notes/explanations 
1. We used the Xtabond2 syntax developed by Roodman (2009) to implement the dynamic panel data estimation in 
Stata. With a view to reducing the number of instruments, the collapse option whereby one instrument for each 
variable and lag distance, rather than the default of one for each period, variable and lag distance is used for the 
endogenous and predetermined variables.  Not all available internal instruments were used as doing so generated 
large number of instruments relative to the number of observations. In the investment equation, lags up to 5 were 
used. For the difference GMM (Column III), the instruments used are Δ(dbts gds crdt open insttn popgr govt ) 
and L(2/5).(dfcf noda fdi Δinf gdpgr) where L(2/5)=lag 2 to 5.  
2. Instruments for first differences equation: 
   Standard:  Δ(dbts gds crdt open insttn popgr govt ) 
   GMM-type: L(2/5).(dfcf noda fdi Δinf gdpgr) where L(2/5)=lag 2 to 5, maximum set at 5 since greater lag 
yielded large     number of instruments relative to sample size. 
Instruments for levels equation: 
   Standard: dbts gds crdt open insttn popgr govt constant 
   GMM-type:  L(2/5).(dfcf noda fdi Δinf gdpgr) where L(2/5)=lag 2 to 5.  
The internal instrument set for other versions of the model are similarly constructed, adjusted according to the 
vector of regressors in use.  
3. Instruments for first differences equation: 
   Standard:  Δ(open insttn logpop infst) and Δ(dbts gds crdt open insttn popgr govt ) 
   GMM-type: L(2/3).(dfcf noda fdi Δinf loggdppc gdpgr natres gdpgr) where L(2/3)=lag 2 to 3 where L(2/3)=lag 
2 to 3, maximum set at 3 since greater lag yielded large number of instruments relative to sample size. 
Instruments for levels equation: 
   Standard:  open insttn logpop infst constant 
   GMM-type:  L(2/3).(dfcf noda fdi Δinf loggdppc gdpgr natres gdpgr).  
The internal instrument set for other versions of the model are similarly constructed, adjusted according to the 
vector of regressors in use. 
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